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Chapter 2
Debunking Interregionalism: Concepts, Types 
and Critique – With a Pan-Atlantic Focus
Gian Luca Gardini and Andrés Malamud
Abstract Interregionalism means region-to-region relations. Its relevance lies on 
two assumptions: that regionalism is a significant mechanism of governance and 
that regions are outward looking. The fact that both assumptions are contested con-
fers the concept of interregionalism a structural fuzziness. In this chapter we seek to 
grasp the phenomenon by following a sequential path: we first deal with definitions, 
types and theory, only then to look into the empirical evidence in search of corre-
spondence between names and facts. By looking into transatlantic interregionalism, 
we find it as a large umbrella that brings together very diverse groupings of coun-
tries under a same, moderately inconsequential, working mechanism: summitry.
Keywords  Atlantic  •  Interregionalism  •  Regional  organisations  •  Regionalism  • 
Regions
2.1  Introduction
On 11 June 2015, 61 chiefs of states or their representatives plus the highest EU 
officials met in Brussels. The occasion brought together one third of the world coun-
tries and was the second EU-CELAC (or 8th EU-LAC) summit, the largest gather-
ing of world regions ever. Yet the standing of the two partners could not be more 
asymmetric. The European Union (EU) is a treaty-based regional organization that 
makes binding decisions, adjudicates conflicts through legal procedures, commands 
a billionaire budget, boasts huge headquarters in several countries and employs 
thousands of people. In contrast, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC) lacks legal personality, decision-making capacities, headquarters, 
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a budget, and any staff. While the EU has a single trade policy and advances towards 
bringing borders down and unifying its currency, the Latin American countries are 
fierce defenders of national sovereignty. The fact that this meeting is considered the 
pinnacle of interregionalism testifies to the elusiveness of the concept.
Interregional relations differ from conventional interstate relations in two 
respects. First, the nature of the actors cannot be taken for granted. Not just states 
but also regional organizations and civil society generally participate in the process. 
Issues of representation and coordination are problematic too. Whereas states need 
to refer to their internal structures and proceedings only sporadically and mainly 
through established procedures when negotiating a deal internationally, regional 
organizations need to have recourse to internal consultation frequently and through 
tortuous and less than formalized mechanisms. Furthermore, as interregional rela-
tions are usually asymmetric  – since they tend to involve regions with different 
degrees of complexity such as the EU vis-à-vis most developing regional group-
ings – explicit support for further integration and the transfer of integration tech-
nologies tend to be a key part of the agreements.
Second, the scope of interregionalism is usually limited to ‘low politics:’ regional 
organizations typically engage in negotiations on economic or social issues rather 
than security or military matters. This said, most interregional agreements do pro-
claim larger political goals and are garnished with verbose rhetoric. Some interre-
gional summits end up by issuing presidential communiqués that mention 
geopolitical issues and envisage the establishment of ‘strategic alliances,’ whatever 
that means. However, these statements rarely reflect or produce concrete results.
Several studies have analyzed the nature, types and prospects of interregional 
relations (América Latina Hoy 2005; Baert et al. 2014; Doidge 2011; Hänggi 2000; 
Hänggi et al. 2006; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). Their conclusions are tentative, 
mostly agreeing on that the multidimensionality of the phenomenon requires the 
combination of different analytical approaches. Initially, interregionalism  – as 
regionalism before it (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996) – was 
amply regarded as a step towards global governance. Lately, however, arguments 
have been raised that consider regionalism and interregionalism as a hindrance for 
global governance (Higgott and Phillips 2000; Kacowicz 2015). Although interre-
gionalism has been defined as “institutionalized relations between world regions” 
(Hänggi et al. 2006: 3), all the elements in this description remain controversial. 
Some authors deem interregionalism unavoidable and irreversible (Kupchan 2006: 
147), as some do with regional integration itself, while others are more skeptical 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2005). Few, such as Doidge (2011, 2014), go beyond mostly 
descriptive or normative accounts. This chapter takes critical stock of the debate 
before diving into the shape that interregionalism has assumed across the Atlantic 
Ocean. By resorting to participant observation and original interviewing with diplo-
mats that participated in the organization of the 2013 EU-Latin America and the 
Caribbean Summit in Santiago de Chile, we map the real world of trans-Atlantic 
relations as defined by its most discernible manifestation – summitry. We further 
argue that, as regionalism recedes and multipolarity consolidates, there is little more 
to expect from interregionalism.
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2.2  Identifying, Classifying and Theorizing Interregionalism
Region-to-region relations, albeit in a loose form, can be traced back to the Lomé 
Convention, a trade and aid agreement between the European Community and 71 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries signed in 1975 in Togo (Söderbaum 
2012). It was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 in Benin by the 
EU with 78 ACP countries. Although its principles stated the equality of partners 
and the ownership of development strategies, an ironic reminiscence of later day 
South-South cooperation, fact is that the ACP countries never constituted a region 
per se but an artificial grouping brought and kept together by an external organiza-
tion. Later on, the EU engaged in interregional cooperation with independent 
regional organizations, beginning with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and gradually spreading towards most regional blocs in the developing 
world.
Interregionalism is thus a fuzzy concept. This should not come unexpected given 
interregionalism’s root concept  – regionalism (Laursen 2003; Malamud 2013; 
Schulz et al. 2001). Unlike pioneering masterpieces on regionalism such as those by 
Nye (1968), Claude (1971) or Lindberg (1963), too many contemporary studies suffer 
from conceptual stretching or fuzziness or both. Although authors usually provide 
some kind of definition for the phenomenon they analyze, few do so in a satisfactory 
manner. Most definitions are either vague or ambiguous. Take, for example, the 
influential characterization by Hettne and Söderbaum (1998:7):
“New regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process, imply-
ing the change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity 
with regard to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, eco-
nomic policies and political regimes”.
In this definition, analytical categories are explicitly non-exhaustive, implicitly 
non-exclusive, and lacking on precedence or hierarchy. This cannot plausibly pro-
duce measurable indicators and testable hypotheses. Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 
9) further define regionalization as
“increasing levels of ‘regionness’, namely the process whereby a geographical region is 
transformed from a passive object to a subject with a capacity to articulate the interests of 
the emerging region” (emphasis added).
Here, the word region is used simultaneously to connote objective geography 
and subjective interests, as well as an existing object and an emerging entity.
A way out of conceptual stretching consists of understanding contemporary 
regionalism as an umbrella expression that covers a multiplicity of phenomena. 
Andrew Hurrell (1995) enumerates five of these, arguing that none should be given 
the exclusive rights to use the term: (a) regionalization, (b) regional awareness and 
identity, (c) regional interstate cooperation, (d) state-promoted regional integration, 
and (e) regional cohesion. The first – regionalization – can be understood as social 
or economic interdependence, which is usually the outcome of market-driven pro-
cesses. The second – regional identity – conveys a cultural rather than a political or 
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economic notion. The common feature of both phenomena is that neither is neces-
sarily purposeful but is brought about by decentered factors – such as increasing 
trade flows or common historical roots. The following three subtypes respond to a 
different logic: they are either the outcome of formal state decisions – cooperation 
and integration – or a consequence of such decisions – regional cohesion. While 
cooperation entails voluntary compliance, integration requires some degree of sov-
ereignty transfer, which discourages unilateral withdrawal and raises the costs of 
process reversion. In these subtypes, Hurrell (1995: 44) claims, “the region plays a 
defining role in the relations between the states (and other major actors) of that 
region and the rest of the world”, while constituting “the organizing basis for policy 
within the region across a range of issues” (emphasis added). This definition uses 
the same concept simultaneously for an actor and an arena. Tautologically, the 
region “plays a role” regarding “policy within the region”. Confusing wording is 
arguably rooted in the nominalization of the adjective regional. The latter should 
rather be conveyed by a noun, which can either be a process (integration) or an 
entity (organization). To give an example, Europe is an intelligibly but highly 
ambiguous noun that should not be collapsed with European integration or with the 
European Union. In these two expressions, “integration” and “union” are nouns 
while “European” becomes an adjective that delimits the particular range of an oth-
erwise general phenomenon. Yet, most literature on regionalism uses “Europe” and 
“the EU” interchangeably. This is a source of contagious confusion, as similar inter-
changeability between a geographic area and an international organization is 
assumed everywhere else – wrongly.
The confusion between regional geography – a set of contiguous countries – and 
regional politics – an organization of contiguous countries – is not just conceptual. 
Real existing cases of interregionalism also come in different configurations. This is 
the reason why the world of interregionalism cannot be understood without splitting 
it into subtypes.
In a pioneering article, Hänggi (2000) developed a typology of interregional 
arrangements to account for existing cases. He distinguished three types:
 (a) pure interregionalism, that is relations between regional groupings (such as EU- 
ASEAN or EU-Mercosur);
 (b) transregionalism, that is arrangements where states participate in an individual 
capacity, as in APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership or EU-Latin America and 
the Caribbean before the establishment of CELAC (this label is also applied to 
more informal relations including non-state actors); and.
 (c) hybrid interregionalism, that is relations between regional groupings and single 
powers (such as the so-called strategic partnerships of the EU with several 
regional powers, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
currently under negotiation).
Hänggi’s types have been dissected, and applied empirically, in a special issue of 
the Journal of European Integration devoted to the EU as a global actor and the role 
of interregionalism (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005).
G.L. Gardini and A. Malamud
19
Hänggi’s second type merits special analysis. Take the case of the South Atlantic 
Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPACAS). This organization was created in 1986 
through a UN general assembly resolution – after a Brazilian initiative – and brings 
together three Latin American and twenty-one African states. Although it may look 
like a bi-regional phenomenon, in practice it is not an agreement between two pre-
existent organizations but between individual states (see Mattheis in this volume). 
Such transregional character is even more apparent in the case of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, which brings together countries from North America, South America, 
Asia and Oceania. In fact, these basin-based agreements erode existing land-based 
regional organizations rather than bringing them together. This centrifugal dynam-
ics has been labeled cross-regionalism and is retaken below.
A bizarre but ever more frequent type of interregionalism is the one developed 
between overlapping regions, that is, regional organizations that share members. In 
these cases, some states sit at both sides of the table. An illustrative case is the rela-
tionship between Mercosur and UNASUR, whose summit meetings are sometimes 
conflated thus making it difficult to disentangle whose logic or regulations apply. 
We have discussed this issue elsewhere (Malamud and Gardini 2012; Gardini and 
Ayuso in this volume) and will not develop it further here, but the articulation of 
segmented and overlapping regionalism has multiplied to the extent that it now falls 
into the folder of interregionalism (Malamud 2013; Hulse et al. 2015). It resembles 
a multidimensional chessboard, with intra- and inter-level interactions, rather than a 
matrioska, in which inner objects just fit into but do not interact with outer objects.
If overlapping interregionalism becomes a fourth type within Hänggi’s typology, 
we suggest that stealth interregionalism might become the fifth one. The paramount 
case is currency integration between several African states and the Euro zone. As it 
happens, the West African CFA franc (the official currency in eight countries), the 
Central African CFA franc (likewise for six other countries), the Comorian franc, 
the Cape Verdean escudo and the São Tomé and Príncipe dobra are all pegged to the 
Euro through bilateral agreements, totaling seventeen independent African states 
whose monetary policy is decided in Paris and Frankfurt (http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/euro/world/other_currencies/index_en.htm, last accessed 4 November 
2014). This makes for one third of the African continent! Studies of interregional-
ism have very rarely included this phenomenon as worth analyzing (for an excep-
tion see Mattheis 2014), although it also takes place in other regions such as the 
Caribbean.
2.2.1  A Modest Typological Proposal
Formal region-to-region relations, Hänggi’s first type, are a logical and chronologi-
cal aftermath of prior regional integration. Afterwards, they can be supportive of 
regional integration along two dimensions. The first one regards the type of involve-
ment of the senior partner – provided there is one, which occurs in most cases stud-
ied in this volume, with the Europe-North America linkage being an exception (see 
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Alcaro and Reilly in this volume). Involvement may be active and focused or pas-
sive and dispersed. The second criterion concerns the dimension in which the inter-
action takes place. This may be either politico-institutional or socio-economic. By 
combining the two criteria, four ideal-typical patterns of interregional relations 
emerge: leadership, emulation, cooperation, and exchange (Table 2.1).
Leadership means that the senior region (usually a regional organization, some-
times a regional hegemon) takes most of the responsibility for establishing the 
goals, monitoring the course, and supporting the instruments required by the junior 
region (not always an organization) to carry out the undertakings agreed upon. A 
historical example is the role played by the United States in the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II and its support to the processes of cooperation, coordina-
tion and integration – albeit, in this case, the United States was a single country and 
not a regional bloc. The US also fostered the creation and early institutionalization 
of the Central American Common Market (CACM) through financial and institu-
tional support; the crisis of the bloc started precisely when the US lost interest in its 
development and ceased to supply leadership. A different kind of leadership may be 
exerted through conditioned inclusion, whereby a regional bloc offers full or limited 
access to neighboring countries (which may until then have belonged to another 
bloc) in exchange for domestic reform. The EU provides the best example of this 
mechanism through its enlargement policies towards EFTA first, Southern and 
Northern European countries later, and Eastern European and Mediterranean coun-
tries more recently.
Emulation is the strategy by which an emergent regional bloc replicates the insti-
tutional structure or the integrating strategy of successful brethren. This was the 
path initially followed by the Andean Community, as it undertook the creation of an 
early supranational structure that reproduced the EU’s (Saldías 2010). Some authors 
contend that mimicry was also at the roots of Mercosur and its institutional evolu-
tion (Medeiros 2000; Rüland and Bechle 2014).
Cooperation stands usually as a euphemism for economic aid. Under this label, 
the senior region does not necessarily participate in the establishment of the junior 
region’s goals, but instead provides it with technological, financial, or economic 
assistance. This is the type of relationship that links the EU to poorer regions such 
as the one bringing together the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries.
Lastly, exchange is arguably the least demanding type of relationship, as it 
involves mostly negative policies – thus easier to pass and implement – such as tariff 
removal and free access to regional markets. This is the case of the ongoing 
Table 2.1 Patterns of formal region-to-region relations
Senior partner’s role
Active Passive (or equal)







Cooperation (aid) Exchange (trade)
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EU-Mercosur negotiations. The negotiation of this kind of agreements is being pro-
gressively upgraded by additional requirements such as investment guarantees, 
intellectual property rights, environmental and labor regulations, and common stan-
dards. Yet, free trade agreements (FTAs) concern chiefly economic matters, and 
trade partners are formally on an equal footing  – in contrast to cooperation 
agreements.
The role of the EU in the development of interregionalism has been studied as a 
case of diffusion. In exploring the extent to which the EU has sought to promote 
regional integration beyond its borders, Börzel and Risse (2009) analyzed what
“the EU seeks to export and how it has used its external relations and foreign policy to 
foster cooperation between regions (inter-regionalism), on the one hand, and regional coop-
eration among third countries, on the other.”
While it is conceivable that other world regions might spontaneously imitate the 
EU institutions, argues Schmitter (2010), the EU “has dedicated considerable 
resources and efforts to clone itself and meets regularly with its ‘counter-parts’ in 
Asia, Latin America and Africa.” In these approaches, the EU acts as external fed-
erator (Santander 2010) and interregionalism is considered a driver of further 
regionalism rather than its consequence.
This book has produced six chapters dealing with different interregional interac-
tions in the Atlantic area. Most of them arrive to similar diagnosis: “serious limita-
tions of actorness” on the part of the engaging regions (Mattheis in this volume), 
large asymmetries or “imbalance in the degree of regionalization”/institutionaliza-
tion (Alcaro and Reilly in this volume; Pirozzi and Godsäter in this volume), and 
low priority conferred to interregional relations (Ayuso et  al. in this volume; 
Kotsopoulos and Goerg in this volume). They also classify most cases into Hänggi’s 
hybrid or quasi-interregional category, and those that deal with the EU accept that it 
has led a leading role (our left column on Table 2.1) except when dealing with the 
North American region (lower right cell on Table  2.1). More distressing are the 
conclusions by Isbell and Nolan García (2015), who claim that “new ocean basin 
regionalisms” are substituting traditional land-based regions, therefore changing the 
nature of interregional relations. The focus on the Atlantic space adopted in this 
book is consistent with the emerging phenomenon of cross-regionalism, which 
defines the simultaneous participation in various trade agreements irrespective of 
geographic location. Tovias (2008: 4) argues that, by engaging in this strategy, states 
“strive to escape their initial uncomfortable status of so-called ‘spoke’ by signing 
agreements with more than one ‘hub’”. The ascendancy of cross-regionalism – and 
the parallel decay of regionalism – stems from the emergence of multipolarity in the 
international system and does not bode well for the standard types of 
interregionalism.
Regardless of the form, purpose and organizational feature that interregionalism 
may assume, most varieties tend to reach a pinnacle in interregional summits. 
Whether relations take place between two regional intergovernmental organizations 
or between “two or more regions that are dispersed and porous, and where neither 
region negotiates as a region” (Söderbaum 2012:1200), exchange and dialogue at 
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the highest political level are defining moments. Thus, interregionalism can be 
understood – at least largely – as an exercise in summitry. This is the focus of the 
following sections of this chapter.
2.3  Interregionalism as Summitry Exercise
Interregionalism across the Atlantic is characterized by an increasing number of 
summits between national and regional leaders. Only in the last 3 years, heads of 
state and/or government, diplomatic corps, and business and civil society represen-
tatives from the four shores of the Atlantic engaged in a multitude of events, includ-
ing – among the most significant – two Summits of the Americas (2012 and 2015); 
a South American-Arab Countries Summit (2012); two EU-Latin America and 
Caribbean Summits (2013 and 2015); an Africa-South America Summit (2013); an 
Africa-EU Summit (2014); an Arab-US Policymakers Conference (2014); and a 
US-Africa Leaders Summit  (2014). Regardless  the  interest,  value,  and  results of 
each of these events, proliferation tends to decrease the marginal returns for all 
stakeholders of huge international assemblies. There is a risk that “too many sum-
mits kill the summits” (Gahr Store 2012: 11).
The “summit fatigue” is by now a well-documented problem in all fields and at 
all latitudes of international activity. For instance, the intensity of the G-20 process 
since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 pushed the Obama administration to call for 
a rationalization of the process and to reject hosting candidatures and new proposals 
for more and more events (Cooper 2010). If the argument is valid for major gather-
ings on topical issues, it is even stronger for specialized events, such as the World 
Summit on Information Society or the World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
In these cases the required presence and use of specific technical expertise as well 
as political representativeness cause strain on state leadership and bureaucracies as 
well as on civil society stakeholders who intend to attend the summit or to partici-
pate in the process before, during or after the core event (O’Siochru 2004; Peake 
2002).
This overcrowded scenario inevitably affects regionalism and interregionalism 
too in their summitry dimension. The increase in the number of summits at the 
European level has raised concern and brought about a number of critiques of sum-
mit inflation in regionalist processes (Melissen 2003). Interregional summits are 
obviously affected too. They have to compete for human and financial resources 
against a large and expanding number of other international – including regional – 
and national commitments. As an illustrative example, it is worth remembering how 
one EU-Latin American and Caribbean Summit had to be postponed for over six 
months because of the congested international agenda. Initially scheduled for June 
2012, it clashed with another three high-profile international meetings the same 
month:  the  G-20  in  Mexico,  the  Rio  +  20  UN  Conference  on  Sustainable 
Development and the Euro Area Summit in Brussels. The summit was eventually 
celebrated at the end of January 2013.
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2.3.1  Problems and Challenges of Interregional Summitry
So what are the key problems of interregionalism as a summitry exercise caused by 
the excessive use of this instrument and the congestion of the international agenda? 
What kind of difficulties and challenges characterize the process? And why, in spite 
of these acknowledged limitations, do interregional summits remain widely used in 
international diplomacy? The type of shortcomings can be understood with refer-
ence firstly to the nature of the problem and secondly to the categories of actors 
affected. The resilience of interregional summits can be explained with arguments 
stemming from both theory and practice of international affairs.
The first problem affecting interregionalism in its summit form is the clarity of 
their aims and purposes. This refers to the expectations and the benefits it generates. 
This in turn leads to a discussion of the parameters used to assess success or failure. 
What are interregional summits for? What outcomes is it legitimate and realistic to 
expect? Whose expectations count most? It seems that significant doubts and uncer-
tainties about the process exist (Caetano 2010). This is valid both for the direct 
participants and the stakeholders broadly understood. Interregional summits more 
than anything else are about dialogue and whether or not they are successful is per-
haps not the right way to pose the question (FCO 1 2013). Instead it would be more 
useful to identify what their purpose and benefits are, and to realize that most of the 
benefits are difficult to measure and quantify and they are to be found at the margins 
of the summits (ibid.). This is a case in which exclusion costs are higher than 
participation’s.
A particular aspect of this discussion on purpose concerns the involvement of 
civil society. Its participation in interregional summits is more and more common 
and it often involves the presentation of position papers to ministerial or head of 
states assemblies. Now, it is quite difficult to assess the exact expectations of gov-
ernments and state actors in these mega events. It is even more difficult to evaluate 
civil society’s, because of the varied nature of its components but also for the lim-
ited understanding stakeholders seem to have of summit procedures and outcomes. 
In these cases, clarity of roles and expectations is problematic. This is also true for 
a number of civil society consultation mechanisms at the international level. As the 
EU DG Trade-Civil Society Dialogue suggests, while the objectives of consultation 
and transparency can be satisfactorily met, more uncertainty exists about policy 
improvement. Similar developments have been registered in the EU-Africa Forum 
(Pirozzi and Godsäter in this volume) and in the Council for Arab Relations with 
Latin America and the Caribbean (CARLAC; Ayuso et al. in this volume). After all, 
civil society’s role is to participate, not to deliberate, and engagement is based on 
the principle “one voice not one vote”, which is often blurred or misunderstood 
(Ecorys 2006).
Another problem that affects interregional summits is time. The organization of 
such high-profile events requires a large amount of time and dedicated teams. This 
is true for the host country, of which a massive logistic and organizational effort is 
required. It is also true for participant countries, which have to contribute to the 
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drafting of the final declaration, discuss and agree on the agenda of the summit itself 
and that of their delegations. The latter always engage in other activities and visits 
on the fringes of the summit in order to maximize the use of time. There is also the 
issue of timing in the calendar year to avoid congested periods or clashes with other 
international or national events where leaders and technical and support teams, not 
least the security ones, may have to participate. Finally, the generally short duration 
of the summit itself gives in fact little time for substantial discussion, and most of 
the work has to be prepared by state bureaucracies in advance.
A related problem is the opportunity cost. Participation in an interregional sum-
mit means that leaders and key state officials, as well as civil society delegations, 
cannot deal with other issues for a few days. With the increasing density of interna-
tional forums and commitments, the decision to send top leaders or high-level rep-
resentatives to interregional summits is a delicate one, precisely because returns 
may not be immediately obvious. Other events and activities may in fact gain more 
political reward or media exposure, and national priorities may just prevail over 
loose international commitments and lengthy speeches and travels. Only 34 heads 
of State out of possible 61 made it to the 2013 EU-Latin American and Caribbean 
summit, which “was met with almost total indifference in Latin America as well as 
in Europe” (Sberro 2013:1). Conversely a failure or a scandal at the summit may 
give unwanted media exposure to leaders. The UK delegation considered a success 
that the same event was not hijacked by radical Latin American leaders and that the 
Falkland-Malvinas issue was not raised at any stage (FCO 1 2013). But the UK had 
not sent either the Head of State or Government or the Foreign Minister, which 
indicates a quite low political interest in the interregional summit. Where a strategic 
value is clearly detectable participation of leaders is high. This was the case at the 
2009 5th Summit of the Americas where President Obama for the first time intro-
duced himself to the other leaders of the Americas. These saw the advantage of 
participation and no country sent representatives of lower status than Head of State 
or Government. In the absence of clear gains or strategic priorities, interregional 
summits struggle to attract top participants, who may find other venues and activi-
ties more convenient according to political or economic calculation.
Interregional summits are expensive exercises. The organization, logistics, com-
munication, transportation and accommodation involved are a burden for taxpayers 
and state finance. Indeed the high cost of interregional summits is particularly evi-
dent when measured against the uncertainty or even the paucity of the results and 
benefits produced (Whitehead and Barahona de Brito 2005). If one considers that 
most of the costs are often bore by the host country, and that for the duty of reciproc-
ity these kind of events often take place in developing countries, one may wonder if 
that money could be better spent otherwise. It is estimated that the 2012 Summit of 
the Americas held in Cartagena, Colombia, cost about 30 million USD, that the 
2008 EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit in Lima, Peru, cost around 35 
million USD, and that, by comparison, the 2012 G-20 in Mexico cost 80 million 
USD (MinRel 1 2012). To this, one has to add the costs for the participants. In times 
of crisis and media watch of public expenses, significant investments in  interregional 
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summits organization and participation ought to be subject to scrutiny and 
rethinking.
Swollen and diluted agendas also constitute a limitation of interregional sum-
mits. A final declaration of countless points and observations is hardly a credible 
commitment and doubtfully a selection of real priorities for cooperation, action or 
even discussion. It certainly presents significant challenges for follow-up and imple-
mentation. As an example the final declaration of the 2014 EU-Africa Summit 
counted on 63 items, while the 2013 final declaration of the EU-Latin America and 
the Caribbean Summit was composed of 48 points, a significant reduction when 
compared to the record 104 points of the 2004 Guadalajara Declaration (see corre-
sponding chapters in this book). Furthermore, at times the contents and provisions 
of interregional summit declarations and action plans “can at best be regarded as 
optimistic assumptions” (Eyinla 2004:176). Yet, understandably, agendas and final 
declarations are a compromise between a large number of countries, even if the 
summit is supposedly between two regional organizations. In addition, with a view 
to interregional summits, coordination mechanisms within regional organizations 
are at times cumbersome, little efficient, or non-existent. This results in the host 
country having to deal with an accumulation of items to be added to the agenda so 
that this can be acceptable to all participants. While this may ensure a level of con-
sensus, it makes the achievement of tangible results, and their communication to 
stakeholders, extremely difficult.
The most problematic aspect of interregional summits is their limited capacity to 
produce practical results. While a specific definition of what practical results means 
may be elusive, there seems to be a quite widespread dissatisfaction at policy deci-
sion and implementation as well as at the paucity of common actions undertaken as 
a direct result of these summits. This is a preoccupation for both policy-makers and 
academics  (MinRel  2  2012  and  MinRel  3  2012; MAE 2012; Maihold 2010; 
Whitehead and Barahona de Brito 2005). A first difficulty is the limited capacity of 
follow-up and implementation of the decisions taken (?) and the priorities identified 
during the summits (Maihold 2010). In interregional summits where the EU is 
involved this aspect generally falls under the competence of the EU Commission 
but the results have been perceived as dissatisfactory (FCO 2 2012; MAE 2012). A 
second aspect concerns the inability of these interregional summits to produce 
actual effects on the international system, and in particular to promote or advance 
the international position of the participants, especially the party perceived as the 
weaker (Maihold 2010). Thirdly, one may wonder if this instrument is in fact inad-
equate to the new global context (Peña 2010). Recent changes at the regional level 
too, such as the creation of new regional groupings or the emergence of new inter-
national powers and aggregations, make the rethinking of the current interregional-
ist schemes a necessity.
The final point to discuss is who is affected by the proliferation of interregional 
summits. Obviously political leaders have to select between competing commit-
ments. They have to justify and balance their choices about participation in national 
and international events in front of the demands and pressure from government 
branches, political parties, opposition, the media, lobby groups, and civil society. 
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State bureaucracies are also highly affected as they have to prepare the travels, 
assess and draft documents, liaise with partners and the organizers, and they often 
struggle with shortage of staff, especially in less advanced countries. Also civil soci-
ety and business who intend to participate in interregional summits find prolifera-
tion problematic due to their limited resources and expertise, costs and opportunity 
costs. Sometimes the real hope for civil society is to have a few minutes with key 
politicians to campaign for their cause rather than give a substantive contribution to 
the summit itself or to one of the collateral events (MAE 2012). Both national and 
transnational civil society organizations require increasing funding and expertise to 
contribute proactively to these processes.
2.3.2  Explaining the Resilience and Proliferation 
of Interregional Summits
In spite of these critiques and apparent lack of tangible results, interregional sum-
mits are inescapable instruments of international diplomacy. A number of theoreti-
cal and empirical reasons have been proposed to explain this resilience. From a 
theoretical perspective, a first explanation is offered by the very processes of region-
alization and globalization, which by limiting the control of nation states on their 
own policy choices in fact encourage states to engage in regional and interregional 
cooperation  (Roloff  1998). This reasoning is broadly adaptable to fit major 
International Relations theories. It fits realist and neo-realist approaches as nation 
states attempt to balance-off regionalist challenges from and alliances of other 
world regions through interregionalism; and it also fits a liberal-institutionalist 
approach as interregionalism can be understood as a joint attempt by nation states to 
manage the complexity of global interdependence (Hänggi 2000).
Another theoretical approach may explain more specifically why, in spite of all 
documented shortcomings and skepticism by policy-makers, interregionalism sur-
vives  and  in  fact proliferates. Rhetorical  action  (Schimmelfennig 2003) suggests 
that rhetorical commitments produce actual effects. That is to say that when a rheto-
ric and narrative exercise is repeated through time and widely accepted, this shapes 
political interests, values and legitimacy and therefore it determines policy actions 
and choices too. Applied to interregionalism, this means that commitment to the 
process expressed in final declarations and convenient political statements and 
media coverage end up perpetuating a system in which few actually do believe. This 
is consistent with the observation that in international affairs the institutionalisation 
of norms produces patterns of behaviour that are hard to alter in the absence of sig-
nificantly changed circumstances (Goldstein and Keohane 1993).
Perhaps the most convincing theoretical explanation is provided by the multi- 
bilateralism approach (Hill and Smith 2011: 401; Le Gloannec 2004). The prolifera-
tion of international forums and gatherings at least makes multilateral events 
convenient venues to take forward bilateral affairs and agendas. Participants have 
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the opportunity to meet the partners in which they are interested and to conduct 
bilateral talks as well as to form ad hoc alliances, not necessarily related to the topic 
under discussion in the multilateral venue. Policy-makers too embrace this explana-
tion (MAE 2012). They see in interregional summits an opportunity to maximize 
time to meet with their key bilateral partners in certain geographic or issue areas. In 
fact, according to a participant in the 2013 EU-Latin America and Caribbean 
Summit, this occasioned good personal links, a chance to take forward the national 
agenda in the region and to be seen by strategic partners (FCO 1 2013). It seems that 
conceptual distinctions between pure interregionalism and more hybrid forms 
(Hänggi 2000) are in fact blurring in the diplomatic practice and the hectic pace of 
today’s international summitry.
In addition to theoretical explanations, there are very practical and pragmatic 
reasons for the resilience and flourishing of interregional summits. Firstly, they pro-
vide a forum for discussion and political direction in interregional relations. This 
top-level dialogue seems not only indispensable but also genuinely functional to the 
process if this has to have any meaningful purpose. Furthermore, change and results 
in these cases are not to be assessed in the short period but over the long run. 
Secondly, with the increase and diversification of regional organizations and the 
reconfiguration of regional spaces and aggregations, as well as power dynamics and 
distribution in various parts of the world, interregionalism is a logical step to con-
nect new regional actors, powers and agendas. Thirdly, most of the shortcomings 
identified by the literature and the policy-makers can be addressed. For instance 
time and money, as well as human resources, can be saved by the use of “virtual 
summits”. The summitry process is perhaps not ideal but it is perfectible and no 
obvious alternative is available. Fourthly, in spite of constant complains at exclusion 
and at the waste of resources, civil society demand for more weight in international 
decision-making often materializes in the quest for more summits, with more space 
for social actors and NGOs within them. For all these reasons, the summitry exer-
cise is a resilient aspect of regionalism and interregionalism. These processes can 
take many forms and evolve institutionally, but dialogue and direction at the highest 
political level remain key to any international political process.
2.4  Conclusions
The analysis of interregionalism varies widely from studies that focus on causes 
through those that highlight processes to those that investigate effects. This varia-
tion sometimes hinders comparison and should be taken into account when con-
ducting further research. Additionally, it raises the question of relevance: is 
interregionalism important because it brings about novel developments or is it sim-
ply a (perhaps unavoidable but) inconsequential by-product of regionalism? 
Furthermore, could it simply be a product of EU foreign policy activism that might 
fade away together with the EU? After all, “theorizing on interregionalism has 
always been intrinsically linked to, and indeed dominated by, the study of the 
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European Union” (Doidge 2014:37).This is one of the issues this book is set to elu-
cidate. The conclusion is that the theoretical focus on the EU does not denote euro-
centrism as much as the real developments on the ground: were it not for the EU, we 
would most probably not be talking of interregionalism as much as we do.
Although there has been progress regarding conceptualization, identification of 
cases and typologies of actors that engage in interregional relations, there is still a 
long way ahead before sound theorizing can take off. In order to define the sub-
stance of what constitutes an actor of an interregional relation, we could paraphrase 
Kissinger and ask, say, what’s the phone number of Latin America? (for that matter, 
Asia, the ACP or UNASUR). Phone number may stand for an autonomous secre-
tariat or any other manifestation of regional institutionalization, without which it is 
conceivable to speak of a forum or arena but not of an international actor (Fabbrini 
and Malamud 2013). The threshold between one and the other has not yet been 
clearly drawn – but it should eventually. An alternative could be not to think of 
thresholds but of degrees of actorness, in a similar vein to what has been proposed 
for regionness. Measuring degrees may provide a better description of empirical 
variation; on the other hand, setting thresholds would allow for the formulation of 
explicative hypotheses, e.g. accounting for spillover effects.
In the available literature, the link between regionalism and interregionalism is 
often unclear – apart from the logic assumption that the latter is somehow derived 
from the former. But, contrary to inter-state relations, regions engage in interre-
gional relations sometimes and with some selected others, though not all the time or 
with all other regions. So, what pushes a region to relate to some – but not all – oth-
ers, or to sometimes relate to states instead of regions? What defines the timing? 
Looking from the reverse angle, is interregionalism able to promote regionalism? If 
such were the case, how far and under what conditions? Finally, there is the question 
of mimicry, resemblance and emulation, which are categories usually utilized to 
describe regionalism: do they also apply to interregionalism? To varying degrees, 
these questions are addressed in several chapters of this book.
There has also been growing interest regarding the relation between culture and 
identity, on the one hand, and regional and interregional processes on the other. 
Neofunctionalism as much as liberal intergovernmentalism contends that interests 
rather than identity drive regional integration, although identity conflicts may hin-
der it. However, cultural variables are sometimes used in order to explain the dif-
ferential performance of diverse interregional processes. Embryonic knowledge and 
imprecise connections ask for more research in this area.
Throughout the recent literature on regional and interregional affairs, and due to 
much ado about informal processes, there is less and less questioning about the 
centrality of the state. Earlier analyses predicting the demise (or at least definitive 
decline) of the state have lost the argument against more ‘realistic’, empirically- 
grounded approaches that bring the state back in. As welcome as this outcome may 
be for political scientists, this news could backfire into our subject matter: if states 
do not matter less, regions might not matter more  – and neither might 
interregionalism.
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